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This paper presents a set of generational accounts that can be used to 
assess the fiscal burden that current generations are placing on future 
generations.  The generational accounts indicate, in present value, the net 
amount that current and future generations are projected to pay to the 
government now and in the future.  These accounts can be understood in terms 
of the government's  intertemporal (long-run) budget constraint.  This 
constraint requires that the sum of generational accounts of all current and 
future generations plus existing government net wealth be sufficient to 
finance the present value of current and future government consumption. 
The generational accounting system represents an alternative to using the 
federal budget deficit to gauge intergenerational policy.  From a theoretical 
perspective, the measured deficit need bear no relationship to the underlying 
intergenerational stance of fiscal policy.  Indeed, from a theoretical 
perspective, the measured deficit simply reflects economically arbitrary 
labeling of government receipts and payments. 
Within the range of reasonable growth and'interest-rate  assumptions, the 
difference between age zero and future generations in generational accounts 
ranges from 17 to 24 percent.  This means that if the fiscal burden on current 
generations is not increased relative to that projected from current policy 
(ignoring the federal budget enacted in 1990) and if future generations are 
treated equally (except for an adjustment for growth), the fiscal burden 
facing all future generations over their lifetimes will be 17 to 24 percent 
larger than that facing newborns in 1989.  The 1990 federal budget will, if it 
sticks, significantly reduce the fiscal burden on future generations. 
The calculations of generational accounts reported here are based solely 
on government receipts and expenditures from the National Income and Product 
Accounts  (NIPA), and reflect the age pattern of government receipts and 
payments as well as the projected substantial aging of the U.S. population. 
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The federal deficit is widely viewed as the United States' number one 
economic problem.  Yet there is no consensus on  how to measure the deficit. 
Some want to exclude the current Social Security surplus, others want to 
include the full value of the savings and loan (S&L)  bailout, and others are 
concerned about adjustments for unfunded government retirement liabilities, 
inflation, growth, and government acquisition and sale of assets.  The debate 
has not been restricted to politicians.  Economists have played a major role 
in lobbying for their favorite definitions of the deficit (e.g., Feldstein 
[I9741 and Eisner and Pieper [1984]). 
Of course, a lot is at stake in how one measures the deficit.  Given 
current policy, leaving out Social Security surpluses means whopping deficits 
through the 1990s, while adjusting for inflation and growth almost turns the 
officially defined deficit into a surplus.  Because the underlying credo of 
fiscal policy is to cut spending or raise taxes to make "the" deficit zero, 
the attention given to the deficit's  definition is not surprising. 
The goal of setting the deficit to zero seems quite strange in light of 
our uncertainty about how the deficit should be measured.  If we are not sure 
what the deficit is, how can we be sure it should be zero?  Rather than 
continuing to debate the deficit's  measurement, perhaps we should first ask 
what concept the deficit is supposed to measure and then determine a measure 
consistent with that concept. 
The conceptual issue associated with the word "deficit" is the 
intergenerational  distribution of welfare.  Specifically, how much are 
different generations paying to finance government consumption and to 
subsidize each other?  Unfortunately, from the perspective of economic theory, 
the deficit is an arbitrary accounting construct whose value has no necessary 
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Kotlikoff (1984, 1988, 1989) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), from a 
theoretical perspective the government can conduct any fiscal policy it 
chooses while simultaneously reporting any size deficit or surplus.  It can do 
so simply through the choice of how it labels its receipts and payments.  -  For 
example, the government can (and does) label workers'  Social Security 
contributions "taxes" and retirees' Social Security benefits "transfers." 
Suppose, instead, that the government labeled workers'  contributions "loans" 
to the government and retirees' benefits "return of principal and interest" on 
these "loans" plus an additional "old age tax" equal to the difference between 
benefits and the "return of principal plus interestn on the "loans."  In this 
case, the reported deficit would be entirely different not only with respect 
to its level, but also with respect to its changes over time.'  This is not an 
isolated example; every dollar the government takes in or pays out is labeled 
in a manner that is economically arbitrary. 
If the deficit has no intrinsic relation to generational policy, what 
measure does?  The answer, according to economic theory, is what we term 
generational accounts.  These are accounts - one for each generation - that 
tally, in present value, the amount of receipts less payments the government 
can expect to collect from each generation during its remaining life span. 
These generational accounts are comprehensive in that they consider all 
receipts and payments collected from or paid to all federal, state, and local 
governments.  In contrast to the deficit, generational accounts are invariant 
to changes in accounting labels.  This may be seen, for example, by 
considering the alternative labeling of Social Security just discussed.  For 
each generation, the present value of its Social Security "taxn  contributions 
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identically equal to the present value of its "old age tax." 
Generational accounts are discussed in the context of the government's 
intertemporal budget constraint, which states that the government's current 
net wealth plus the present value of the government's  net receipts from all 
current and future generations (the generational accounts) must be sufficient 
to pay for the present value of the government's  current and future 
consumption.  By comparing what the government is projected to take from 
current generations with the difference between its projected consumption 
expenditures and its current net wealth, one can estimate the amount that 
future generations will need to pay.  Hence, the generational account approach 
indicates directly the burden on future generations imposed by  increases in 
expenditures on existing generations, including the elderly generations 
currently alive.  This "zero sum" feature of the government's  intertemporal 
budget constraint (some generation has to pay for any benefit to another 
generation) imposes a useful discipline on fiscal analysis.  If the government 
were to adopt the accounting framework  developed in this study, it would be 
required to specify the costs to be borne by future generations for programs 
that help existing generations, and vice versa. 
The generational accounts can also be used to assess the effects on 
national saving of programs to redistribute more or less to current 
generations.  For example, a decision to lower Medicare benefits means an 
increase in the expected present value of net payments to the government by 
the existing elderly.  The change in the present-value  accounts of each 
elderly generation due to this policy represents the change in their lifetime 
resources.  Using recent generation-specific estimates of the propensity to 
consume out of lifetime resources developed by Abel, Bernheim, and Kotlikoff 
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consumption and national saving. 
The primary sources of data used in this study are the Bureau of the 
Census' Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),  the Social Security 
Administration's population projections, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' 
Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES)  from 1980 onward,  and the National Income 
and Product  Accounts (NIPA) reported in the July 1990 Survey of Current 
Business  . 
The findings of this paper suggest a larger fiscal burden - 17 to 24 
percent larger - on future generations than the burden to be imposed on 1989 
newborns under current policy (ignoring the 1990 federal budget deal).  These 
figures are adjusted for growth; i.e., the increase is 17 to 24 percent above 
the increase in fiscal burden that would accompany trend growth.  The 
assessment that future generations face 17 to 24 percent higher net taxes over 
the course of their lifetimes suggests a significant generational problem.  If 
it is not subverted,  the new federal budget deal will substantially reduce, if 
not eliminate, the additional burden that would otherwise be imposed on future 
generations. 
The paper continues in section I1  with a more precise description of both 
generational accounts and their relationship to the government's  intertemporal 
budget constraint.  Section I11 describes how one can use the generational 
accounts to assess the generational stance of fiscal policy.  Section IV 
considers the relationship of each generation's  account to its own lifetime 
budget constraint.  Section V provides a detailed description of the data 
sources and methodology used in calculating the generational accounts. 
Section VI presents our findings,  including policy simulations.  Our findings 
should be viewed as preliminary because a number of aspects of our 
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process of procuring.  We simulate 1) the President's proposed capital-gains 
tax cut, 2) eliminating the 1983 Social Security benefit cuts scheduled to go 
into effect around the turn of the century, 3)  growth in Medicare spending in 
excess of the economywide growth rate, 4) the impact of the $500 billion SdrL 
bailout, 5) slower growth in government consumption spending, and 6) the 
budget deal enacted by Congress and signed by the President.  Finally, 
section  VII summarizes our findings and draws conclusions. 
11. Generational Accounts 
The term "generations" refers in this paper to males and females by 
specific years of age.  The term "net payments" refers to the difference 
between government tax receipts of all types (such as federal and state income 
taxes) and government transfer payments of all types (such as Social Security 
benefits, unemployment benefits, and food stamps).  Finally, all present 
values reflect discounting at a pre-tax  interest rate. 
To make the generational accounts and their relationship to the 
government's  budget constraint more precise, we write the government's 
intertemporal budget constraint for year t in equation (1): 
D  Q)  Q) 
(1 
1 
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The first term on the left-hand  side of (1) is the sum of the present value of 
the net payments of existing generations.  The expression N  stands for the  t,k 
present value of net remaining lifetime payments to the government of the 
generation born in year k discounted to year t.  The index s in this summation 
runs from age 0 to age D, the maximum length of life.  Hence, the first 
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of the generation born in year t;  the last term is Nt,t-D,  the present value 
of remaining net payments of the oldest generation alive in year t, namely 
those born in year t-D.  The second term on the left-hand  side of (1) is the 
sum of the present value of remaining net payments of future generations.  The 
third term on the left-hand  side, wgt, denotes the government's  net wealth in 
year t.  The right-hand side of (1) expresses the present value of government 
consumption.  In the latter expression, Gs stands for government consumption 
expenditure in year s,  and r  stands for the pre-tax  rate of return in year j. 
Equation (1) indicates the zero-sum nature of intergenerational fiscal 
policy.  Holding the right-hand  side of equation (1) fixed, increased 
(decreased) government payments to (receipts taken from) existing generations 
mean a decrease in the first term on the left-hand side of (1) and require an 
offsetting increase in the second term on the left-hand side of (1);  i.e., 
they require reduced payments to, or increased payments from, future 
generations. 
The term Ntlk  is defined in equation (2): 
- 
In  expression (2),  TSsk  stands for the projected average net payment to the 
government made in  year s by a member of the generation born in year k.  By a 
generation's  average net payment in year s, we mean the average across all 
members of the generation alive in year s of payments made, such as for income 
and Federal Insurance Contributions  Act  (FICA) taxes, less all transfers 
received, such as from Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI), 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Unemployment Insurance (UI), 
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in year s who were born in year k.  For generations born prior to year t, the 
summation begins in year t.  For generations born in year k, where k>t,  the 
summation  begins in year k.  Regardless of the generation's  year of  birth, the 
discounting is always back to year t. 
A set of generational accounts is simply a set of values of Nt,k, one for 
each existing and future generation, with the property that the combined total 
value adds up to the right-hand  side of equation (1).  In our calculation of 
the NtSkts  for existing generations (those  whose &1989),  we distinguish male 
from female cohorts, but to ease notation, we do not append sex subscripts to 
the terms in equations (1) and (2). 
III. Assessing the Intergenerational Stance of Fiscal Policy 
Once we have calculated the right-hand  side of equation (1) and the first 
term on the left-hand  side of equation (I), we determine, as a residual, the 
value of the second term on the right-hand  side of equation (I),  which is the 
present value of payments required of future generations.  We further 
determine the amount that needs to be taken from each successive generation to 
balance the government's  intertemporal  budget, assuming that each successive 
generation's  payment is the same up to an adjustment for real productivity 
growth. 
This growth-adjusted  constant amount is what must be taken from 
successive generations to maintain what Kotlikoff.(1989) terms "fiscal 
balance."  One can compare this measure with the actual amount projected to be 
taken under current policy from existing generations, particularly the 
generation that has just been born.  In other words, these data provide the 
answer to the question: Given the projected treatment of current generations 
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more from future generations than we are planning (as reflected by current 
policy) to take from current generations?  In  particular, is Nt,t 
substantially smaller than Nt,t+l under the assumption that all values of N  t,  s 
for s>t+l equal Nt,t+l, except for an adjustment for productivity growth?  2 
Note that our assumption that all values of Nt,,  for s>t+l are equal, 
except for a growth adjustment, is just one of many assumptions one could make 
about the distribution across future generations of their collective net 
payment to the government.  We could, for example, assume a phase-in  of the 
additional fiscal burden (which could be negative) to be imposed on  new young 
generations.  Clearly, this would mean that new young generations born after 
the phase-in  period has elapsed would face a larger (or possibly smaller) Nt,s 
than  we are calculating here.  Our purpose in assuming both 1) growth-adjusted 
equal treatment of future generations and 2) that the Nt,,'s  of current 
generations are those one would project under current policy is to illustrate 
the potential intergenerational imbalance in fiscal policy and the potential 
need for adjusting current fiscal policy.  Our intent is not to claim that 
policy will necessarily deal with the intergenerational imbalance by treating 
all future generations equally or, indeed, by putting all of the burden on 
future generations. 
Understanding the size of the Ntlk's for current generations and their 
likely magnitude for future generations is not the end of the story with 
respect to assessing the intergenerational stance or incidence of fiscal 
policy.  As studied in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), intergenerational 
redistribution  will alter the time path of factor prices and, thereby, the 
intergenerational  distribution of welfare.  Such changes in factor prices 
result from changes in the supply of capital relative to labor.  But the 
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changes in consumption and labor supply decisions, which are based on private 
lifetime budget constraints.  As described in the next section, the Nt,k's 
enter private budget constraints.  Hence, knowing how their values change is 
essential not only for understanding the direct effect of government policy on 
the intergenerational welfare distribution, but also for assessing the changes 
in factor prices that may result from the policy.  Thus, understanding fully 
the incidence of intergenerational fiscal policy requires knowledge of changes 
in the values of the Nt,k's  arising from the policy. 
Indeed, one of the future goals of this research is to consider how 
policies other than those examined here might affect the values of the Nt,k's 
for the elderly and other existing generations and to assess the impact of 
such policies on national saving.  In  a recent study, Abel, Bernheim, and 
Kotlikoff (1991) used CES data to calculate average and marginal propensities 
to consume of U.S. households according to the age of the household head.  We 
intend to use these results to determine the U.S.  consumption response to a 
range of potential intergenerational fiscal policies.  A generation's 
consumption response to the hypothetical policies will simply be calculated as 
the change in the generation's  N  multiplied by the corresponding marginal  t ,  k 
propensity to consume. 
IV. How Do the Ntlk's Enter  Private Budget Constraints? 
The lifetime budget constraint of each generation specifies that the 
present value of its consumption must equal its current net wealth, plus the 
present value of its human wealth, plus the present value of its net private 
intergenerational transfers, less the present value of its net payments to the 
government, its Nt,k.  This section shows precisely how the NtSk's enter 
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additional information to infer the extent of net private intergenerational 
transfers. 
For the generation  born in year k, the year t remaining lifetime budget 
constraint is 
k+D -  -  s  1  k+D  -  S 
TI  1 
(3)  s-t  x[Cs,k+ls,klPs,kj-t+ll+rj  = ~:,k+  s=t  Es,kPs,k j=t+l  a  --  l+r  j  Nt,  k* 
- 
The terms Es,k.  Is&,  and fs  ,k stand, respectively, for the average values 
in year s of consumption, private net intergenerational transfers,  and labor 
earnings of the generation born in year k.  The term uptnk  stands for the year 
t net wealth of the generation born in year k.  This equation states that the 
sum of the present value of the cohort's  projected consumption  and its net 
intergenerational transfers equals the present value of its resources.  The 
present value of its resources equals, in turn, its net wealth, plus the 
present value of its labor earnings, less the present value of its net 
payments to the government, Nt,k.  Data are available for estimating the 
present value of a cohort's  consumption, the present value of its labor 
earnings, and its current net worth.  Hence, in future work we intend to 
compare our estimates of N  with the projected present value of the cohort's  t  ,k 
remaining lifetime resources.  We will also use these data and equation (3) to 
derive, as a residual, an estimate of the projected present value of the 
cohort's  net private intergenerational transfers. 
As mentioned, in our actual calculations  we distinguish generations by 
sex as well as age in 1990.  Our calculated age- and sex-specific values for 
the present value of intergenerational transfers include, therefore, 
intragenerational transfers from males to females.  Hence, in determining the 
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combine the calculated private transfers of male and female generations of the 
same age.  This provides us with a statement of the net present value of 
private transfers given by  (received from) both the male and the female 
members of a given generation to members of other generations. 
In the previous section we discussed comparing the N  *s  of future  t  ,  k 
generations with NtPt,  which is the net lifetime payments of the generation 
that was born at time t.  We also discussed comparing the Ntgk*s  of all 
existing generations under current policy with their respective values under a 
different policy.  These comparisons, which involve differences (either across 
generations or across policies) in NtPk1s,  are invariant to the accounting 
framework we are adopting, although the absolute values of the Nttk*s  depend 
on our accounting framework. 
To see this point, consider once again the labeling of Social Security 
receipts and payments.  Although the U.S.  government labels Social Security 
contributions as "taxes" and Social Security benefits as "transfers," from the 
perspective of economic theory one could equally well label these 
contributions as "private saving" (invested in government bonds) and label the 
benefits as the "return of principal plus interest" on that saving, less an 
"old age tax" that would be positive or negative, depending on whether the 
Social Security system was less than or more than actuarially fair in present 
value.  Under either choice of labels, the right-hand side of the budget 
constraint (3) would retain the same value, but the division of the right-hand 
side between wPt and Nk ,  would change.  It is in this sense that the absolute 
value of  the Nk,t's  depends on the accounting framework.  However, regardless 
of which way one accounts for (labels) the Social Security system, the change 
in the value of  Nt,k from a policy change, such as a reduction in Social 
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change in the value of the Nt,k's  would simply equal the reduction for 
generation k in the time t present value of their receipts from Social 
Security.  Under the "private saving less an old age taxn labeling, the change 
in the value of the NtSk's would simply equal the increase for generation k in 
the time t present value of their old age tax. 
Although the change in the value of the NtSk's associated with a policy 
change is invariant to the accounting convention (the choice of labels for 
government receipts and payments),  the same is not true for the government's 
budget deficit.  The same change in policy will lead to different changes in 
the reported budget deficit depending on one's  choice of labels for government 
receipts and payments.  For example, consider the impact of an equal reduction 
in Social Security contributions and benefit payments under the two labeling 
schemes for Social Security.  If the contributions are labeled "taxes" and the 
benefits are labeled "transfers," this policy change will have no effect on 
the budget deficit, since the change in "taxesn equals the change in 
"transfern spending.  In  contrast, if Social Security contributions are 
labeled "private saving" and Social Security benefits are labeled "return of 
principal plus interest" plus "an old age tax," an equal and simultaneous 
reduction in contributions and benefit payments will mean a larger "old age 
taxn for elderly recipients and will imply a reduction in the budget deficit. 
V. Calculating the Ntlk8s  and  Other Components of the Government  and Each 
Generation 's  In tertemporal  Budget  Constraints 
A.  Data Sources for Calculatin~  Net Pavments 
According to equation (2),  estimating the values of the N  's  requires  t,k 
projections of net payments, the Ts  ,  k's  for D+lesZk, population proj  actions, 
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the population by age and sex are available from the Social Security 
Administration through 2050, and we have extrapolated these projections 
through the year 2100 in the course of a study of demographics and saving 
(Auerbach,  Cai, and Kotlikoff [1990]). 
We use SIPP data to calculate the average 1984 values by age and sex of 
each of the different types of government receipts and payments covered in 
SIPP.  The SIPP sample size is roughly 16,000 U.S. households.  The SIPP is a 
panel survey that reinterviewed respondent households eight times (every four 
months) over the course of two years.  The first wave of interviews began in 
July 1983 and ended in July 1985.  Thus, for 1984, there is a complete 
calendar year of SIPP data.  The government receipts and payments in the SIPP 
survey include federal and state income and FICA taxes, food stamps, AFDC and 
WIC benefits, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), general relief, unemployment 
compensation, Social Security retirement, survivor and disability benefits, 
other welfare, foster child care, and other government transfers.  Denton 
Vaughan (1989) provides a detailed analysis of the improvements in the 
measurement of government receipts and payments in the SIPP as compared  with 
other surveys such as The Current Population Survey. 
The major deficiency in SIPP's  coverage of government receipts and 
payments is with respect to Medicaid and Medicare health care payments.  To 
determine the average amount of Medicare payments by age (the data are not 
available by sex),  we use Waldo et al.'s  (1989) calculations of average 
expenditures by age.  Data on Medicaid expenditures by age and sex were 
obtained from the Health Care Financing Administration (1990). 
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The  average values of  the receipts and payments by  age and  sex calculated 
from  SIPP  and the Medicare  data are used only to determine  the values of  these 
receipts and payments  by  age and  sex relative to that of  a base age-sex 
category, which  we  take to be 40-year-old  males.  Given  these relative 
profiles, we  determine our initial year  (1990)  average values of  each type  of 
payment  and  receipt by  age  and  sex by benchmarking  against aggregate totals 
reported in the NIPA  aggregate values of  government  receipts and transfers. 
We  then assume  that the age-  and sex-specific  average values of  these payments 
and receipts in future years equal those calculated for 1990,  adjusted for an 
assumed growth rate. 
To  provide an example  of  this procedure  in a simple two-period  context 
where  there are only young  and  old,  suppose  total receipts of  a certain type 
at a given date equal $1,000 and suppose we  know  that the average payment  for 
old people equals twice the average for the young.  Also  suppose we  know  that 
there are 200 young  and  150 old.  Then  the amount  paid by  each young  person Z 
must  satisfy $1,000 - Z  x 200  + Z  x 2 x 150.  Solving this equation for Z  and 
multiplying by  2 gives the amount  paid on  average by  old people.  If the 
growth  rate is g,  then the projected payment  of  the young  (old) k periods from 
now  is z x  (l+g)k  12  x z x  (I+~)~]. 
More  generally, we  denote by  Rrnagi  (RfaPi)  the average value of  the ith 
payment  or receipt made  by  (received by)  an age a male  (female)  in 1984 
divided by  the average value of  the type i payment  (receipt) made  by  40-year- 
old males  in 1984.  Let Hi,t  denote the aggregate revenues  (expenditures) of 
type i received by  (made  by)  the government  in  year t  (1990).  Finally,  let 
pa,i,t  and Ef  i,  denote,  respectively,  the average values for males  and 
females of  payment  (receipt) i in year t.  Then  we  have 
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the average value of these payments (receipts) for 40-year-old  males times the 
cross product of the age-sex  profile for payment (receipt) i and the 
population by age and sex.  We use equation (4)  to solve for i;D40, i,  t.  The 
values of the Pa,ist  '  s a40  and the Cfa,  '  s are obtained by multiplying 
p40,i,t  by RrnaSi  and RfaSi,  respectively.  We assume that papi,,  and 
Lfa,i,s  for s>t equal their respective year t values multiplied by an assumed 
growth factor.  The term ?fs  ,k  for males  (females) in equation (2) is 
determined by summing over i the values of T-k,  i,  (Gfs-k,  +). 
Clearly, for certain types of payments and receipts, such as Medicare 
benefits, the choice of the proper growth factor may be particularly 
difficult.  But rather than choose one value, we present results for different 
growth rate assumptions.  The same type of sensitivity analysis applies to the 
choice of the interest rate to be used in the discounting.  While the absolute 
magnitude of the terms in the government's  intertemporal budget constraint are 
sensitive to these assumptions, the assessment of the burden being placed on 
future generations relative to that being placed on current generations 
happens to be not very sensitive to these assumptions. 
C. The Treatment of Labor Income Taxes 
We determine the relative profile of total labor income by age and sex 
from the SIPP data and apply this profile to aggregate labor income taxes. 
The aggregate value of labor income tax payments is calculated as 80.4 percent 
of total federal, state, and local income taxes, where 80.4 is labor's  share 
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share of proprietorship and partnership income as well as its share of 
indirect tax payments equals its share of net national product.  The resulting 
figure for aggregate labor income taxes is $446.1 billion. 
D. * 
We use information on labor earnings in the SIPP to infer the amount of 
FICA taxes paid by each household member.  From these data we then determine 
the relative profile of FICA tax payments by age and sex.  This profile is 
benchmarked against aggregate social insurance contributions, including 
contributions by government workers to their pension funds.  The 1989 value of 
aggregate contributions for social insurance is $476.8 billion. 
E.  The Treatment of Capital Income Taxes 
Taxes on capital income require special treatment for two related 
reasons.  First, unlike other taxes, taxes on capital income may be 
capitalized into the value of existing (old) assets.  Second, the time pattern 
of income and tax payments may differ.  As a result, capital income taxes must 
be attributed with care in order to ensure that they are assigned to the 
proper generation.  If all forms of capital income were taxed at the same 
rate, there would be no such problem.  All assets would yield the same rate of 
return before tax (adjusted for risk) and each individual would face a rate of 
return reduced by the full extent of the tax.  However, if tax rates on the 
income from some assets, typically older ones, are higher than those facing 
income from new assets (e.g., because of investment incentives targeted toward 
new investment), a simple arbitrage argument (see, for example, Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff [1987],  chapter 9) indicates that the extra tax burden on the old 
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favorable treatment.  This suggests that the flow of capital income taxes 
overstates the burden on new investment.  On the other hand, the presence of 
accelerated depreciation allowances works in the opposite direction, since 
initial tax payments from new investment understate the long-run tax burden on 
such investments.  Although current tax payments overstate the tax burden on 
new capital by their inclusion of taxes that are already capitalized in the 
value of existing assets, the understatement of the burden on new investment 
works in the opposite direction. 
We require a method that calculates the value of capitalized taxes and 
corrects the flow of taxes for these two measurement problems.  The appendix 
provides such a method.  To illustrate the nature of the correction, consider 
the case of cash-flow  taxation, in which assets are written off immediately. 
A well-known result is that the effective marginal capital income tax rate 
under cash-flow taxation is zero.  However, taxes would be collected each year 
on existing capital assets, and such assets should therefore be valued at a 
discount.  Assigning these taxes to the assets* initial owners, rather than to 
members of future generations who may purchase the assets, recognizes that 
future generations may freely invest in new assets and pay a zero rate of tax 
on the resulting income.  Our correction to actual tax payments should, in 
this case, result in a zero tax burden on the income from new assets. 
The principle underlying our treatment of intramarginal capital income 
taxes and the discounting of other payments and receipts at pre-tax  rates of 
return is that one can express private intertemporal budget constraints in the 
presence of government behavior as 1) the budget constraint that would prevail 
in the absence of the government with 2) a single modification to the present 
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payment to the government. In other words, one can express private budgets in 
terms of pre-tax  prices less net taxes valued at pre-tax  prices.  In the case 
of our adjustment for intramarginal capital income taxes, we are simply 
valuing capital at its pre-tax  price and treating the capitalized value of 
taxes as another payment required by the government from the owners of that 
capital. 
In allocating capital income taxes we 1) correct our estimate of future 
capital income taxes to account for their inclusion of taxes on  old capital 
and the generational timing of capital income taxes, 2) use equation (4)  and 
the SIPP profile of private net wealth holdings by age and sex to allocate 
total 1989 taxes on new capital by age and sex, 3)  project future capital 
income taxes by age and sex using the 1989 age- and sex-specific values 
adjusted for growth, and 4) allocate to 1989 owners of capital as a one-time 
tax payment the 1989 capitalized value of the excess taxation of older 
capital.  The allocation of this one-time  tax by age and sex is based on the 
SIPP profile of asset holdings by age and sex.  Note that in the budget 
constraint of each existing generation, we value its holdings of existing 
capital at market value plus the capitalized value of intramarginal taxes. 
In  these calculations,  we set aggregate capital income taxes equal to 
19.6 percent (capital's  share of net national product) of total federal, 
state, and local income taxes,  plus federal, state, and local corporate taxes 
(excluding the profits of the Federal Reserve System),  plus estate taxes.  The 
resulting  value of 1989 aggregate capital income taxes is $234.9 billion. 
Using the method described in the appendix, we estimate that the flow of 
capital income taxes in 1989 overstated the capital income tax burden on new 
investment by $6.09 billion and that the capitalized value of excess taxes on 
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following manner.  We take the value of nonresidential equipment and 
structures plus the value of non-owner-occupied  housing owned by taxable 
investors (both of which are reported in the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds for 
1989),  $5,488.8 trillion, and multiply this by 11.1 percent, our estimate of 
the tax-induced  percentage difference between the market value and replacement 
cost of these assets.  We allocate the $609 billion ($5,488.8 x  .Ill) in 
capitalized taxes as a one-time  tax to those age- and sex-specific 1989 
cohorts according to the SIPP profile of relative net wealth holdings by age 
and sex. 
F. rntpk3 
Another form of payment to the government is the seignorage it collects 
on private holdings of money balances.  Net of the negligible costs of 
printing money, the government collects, in each year, resources equal to the 
real value of new money printed.  In  holding this money, households forgo the 
nominal rate of return available on other assets. 
Our strategy for attributing seignorage to different generations may be 
illustrated using the analogy of an excise tax on durable goods.  Suppose the 
government levied such an excise tax.  Households would then spend more to 
obtain durables, and would therefore face a higher imputed cost of using these 
goods until they had depreciated or were sold.  If a durable good were sold 
(tax free) in the future, it would command a price in excess of its 
replacement cost, reflecting the arbitrage with respect to new durables facing 
the excise tax.  A measure of the net fiscal burden imposed on the household 
by the excise tax is the household's  tax payment upon purchase less this 
recoupment of the tax upon sale, discounted to the present.  In the same way, 
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by treating the entire acquisition of  money balances as a payment to the 
government and the disposition of money balances as a transfer from the 
government.  This has the effect of imputing a cost equal to the nominal 
interest rate on the holding of money balances, and also attributes to all 
current and future generations taken together a total fiscal burden equal to 
the present value of government receipts from printing money. 
We add the present value of such seignorage payments to the present value 
of other net payments in forming the Nt,k's.  Specifically, we project average 
money balances held by each age- and sex-specific generation through the 
remainder of its life and add each year's  net acquisitions (positive or 
negative) of the monetary base to the Nt,k's.  As with all of our 
calculations, we have been careful to benchmark against national aggregates. 
In this case, we have ensured that the sum of age- and sex-specific 
generations' net acquisitions of the monetary base equals the Dec. 1988 to 
Dec. 1989 change in aggregate base money, which is $21.6 billion. 
G.  Including:  Excise Taxes in the Nt,kh 
Excise tax payments are not included in the SIPP data.  To determine the 
amount of excise taxes paid by the age-  and sex-specific  generations, we use 
the CES data.  We use these calculations as well to project each generation's 
annual flow and present value of excise taxes.  Our benchmark value of 
aggregate 1989 excise taxes of $414.0 billion equals the 1989 NIPA value of 
total excise taxes, less total property taxes, plus business property taxes; 
i.e., we include only those property taxes assessed on business.  We use the 
U.S.  Department of Commerce's  (1987) share of business property tax 
assessments in total (business  plus residential) property tax assessments to 
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43.9 percent.  In determining the 1989 NIPA value of total excise taxes, we 
include those state and local property and excise taxes listed in the NIPA 
accounts as "Personal Tax and Nontax Receipts."  We do not, however, include 
those nontax receipts that are included as part of "Personal Tax and Nontax 
Receipts" as excise taxes.  Instead, we treat these items, which include 
tuition and hospital charges, as a return to government assets. 
'  s  H. Includin~  Residential Pro~ertv  Taxes in the Nt,k- 
We treat residential property taxes as excise taxes on home ownership and 
allocate these taxes by age and sex using an age-sex profile of relative house 
values.  This profile was obtained from the SIPP data for 1984.  In this 
calculation, house values for married couples were divided evenly between the 
spouses.  As in the case of other taxes, we benchmark average property taxes 
by age and sex using the 1989 value of total residential property taxes, which 
equals $62.4 billion, and we project future average property tax payments 
using the 1989 age- and sex-specific  averages with an  adjustment for growth. 
I. Treatment of Social Security and Other Government Transfers 
We divide total government transfer payments excluding federal, state, 
and local civil service, railroad retirement, and veterans' benefits into six 
categories: OASDI (including Federal Supplementary Security Income),  hospital 
insurance (HI or Medicare), AFDC, general welfare (including Medicaid), 
unemployment insurance (UI),  and food stamps (including WIC).  We use the SIPP 
data to determine relative profiles by age and sex of each of these categories 
of government transfers.  To determine average 1989 values.of  these transfer 
payments, we benchmark the relative profiles against the NIPA aggregates using 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmequation (4).  The absolute average values of each type of transfer.  payment by 
age and sex in future years are assumed to equal their respective 1989 values 
adjusted for growth.  The one exception to this procedure is with respect to 
future Social Security benefits.  We make a rough adjustment for the impact of 
the 1983 Social Security amendments on future benefits of the baby boom and 
subsequent generations.  These amendments reduce future Social Security 
benefits by 1) phasing in a two-year delay in the receipt of normal retirement 
benefits and 2) subjecting an increasing share of Social Security benefits to 
federal income taxation.  Our adjustment involves reducing the average Social 
Security benefits of each new cohort who reaches age 65 in the year 2000 and 
beyond.  The reduction in each year's  post-age-65  benefit is 1 percent for 
cohorts who are age 65 in the year 2000, 2 percent for cohorts who are age 65 
in 2001, 3 percent for cohorts who are age 65 in 2002, etc., with a maximum 
reduction of 15 percent.  Thus, cohorts who reach age 65 in 2014 or later 
experience a 15-percent  reduction in the average annual value of their post- 
age-64  Social Security benefits relative to the growth-adjusted value of the 
same Social Security benefits prevailing in 1989. 
J . Calculatin~~~  -ent  Consum~tion 
Our procedure for projecting the future path of total government 
consumption is to decompose total 1990 government consumption expenditures 
into 1) expenditures on those aged 0-24,  25-64,  and 65+ and 2) non-age- 
specific expenditures, such as defen~e.~  We denote year t expenditures on 
- 
those aged 0 to 24 divided by the year t population aged 0 to 64  as gy,t, 
where y stands for young.  We denote &,,  ,  and zo,  as the corresponding year 
t average government consumption expenditures on the middle-aged  (those 25 to 
64) and old (those 65 and older).  Finally, we denote gt as the year t level 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmof non-age-specific  government expenditures divided by the total year t 
-  -  -  - 
population.  We assume that the values of gyys~  Cys.  go,  and gs for s>t 
equal their respective year t values multiplied by a common growth factor. 
Total government consumption expenditures in year s are then determined as 
where Py,s,  PmYs,  Po,,,  and Ps stand for the population of young, middle-aged, 
old, and the total population in year s.  We use the OECD's  1986 division of 
total U.S.  government consumption expenditures among the four expenditure 
categories plus our benchmark value of aggregate expenditures,  Gs9  to 
-  -  -  - 
determine the values of  hyt,  gost,  and gt.  The OECD's  division of 
U.S. government consumption expenditures was 29.1 percent on the young (aged 
0-24),  6.0  percent on the middle-aged  (aged 25-64),  7.1  percent on the old 
(65+),  and the remaining 57.8 percent on the total population.  Our measure of 
Gt is the 1989 NIPA value of total government consumption expenditures plus 
the value of civil service,  military, and veterans' retirement,  medical, and 
disability benefits.  We include these additional payments as part of 
government consumption rather than as transfer payments because they are part 
of government compensation to its employees.  The resulting value for 1989 
total government consumption expenditures is $1.142 trillion. 
An  important issue in considering government as well as private 
consumption is the treatment of durable goods.  The proper economic treatment 
involves imputing rent on private and government durables and including this 
rent (and excluding expenditures on durables) in private and government 
consumption, respectively.  Except for housing, however, NIPA treats 
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treatment of durable goods in this paper, future analysis will adjust for the 
proper economic treatment of private and government expenditures on durables. 
K. 
Because we want our generational accounts and analysis of different 
generations' private budget constraints to be consistent with NIPA data, 
including the total (federal, state, and local) government deficit, we take as 
our measure of 1989 total government net wealth net government interest 
payments divided by  the sum of 1) our assumed real interest rate and 2) an 
assumed 5 percent inflation rate.4  Our measure of government net interest 
payments is $79.4 billion smaller than the NIPA figure of $131.8 billion 
because we categorize state and local nontax receipts as positive capital 
income earned on state and local assets.  Assuming a 6 percent real interest 
rate, the 1989 value of government net wealth is -$571 billion. 
L. ;h 
The 1984 SIPP data are used to determine the age- and sex-specific 
relative wealth profile.  Specifically, we calculate the weighted-average 
values of net wealth by age and sex for 1984 and normalize these values by the 
weighted-average value of net wealth of 40-year-old  males.  This provides 
values of Qma and qfa, the relative age-sex  wealth profile.  Total private- 
sector wealth in 1989 can then be written as 
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and  is total 1989 private net wealth.  Equation (6) may be used to solve 
for p40,  t.  The corresponding  values of pa,  a40  and qfa,, are 
determined by multiplying p40  by Q~~ and gfj  , respectively. 
In  using the SIPP data, we distribute household wealth to the owner of 
that wealth, where the ownership is indicated.  In the case of married 
couples, we allocate half of the household's  total wealth to each spouse.  We 
set future values of net wealth by age and sex equal to the 1989 values 
adjusted for growth. 
M. The Choice of Interest Rate 
The government budget constraint given in equation (1) depends crucially 
on the choice of the interest rate r that is used in discounting future flows 
to and from the government sector.  If all such flows were certain and 
riskless, it would.clearly  be appropriate to use the government's  borrowing 
rate, essentially a risk-free rate, in our calculations.  Given that these 
flows are only estimated,  however,  which rate is appropriate to use? 
The answer to this question depends on what we mean by fiscal balance in 
the presence of uncertainty.  On the one hand, there is a straightforward 
argument that the government's  actual borrowing rate is still appropriate. 
Suppose, for example, that a future receipt has an expected value of x, but 
that the true value of the receipt may turn out to be higher or lower.  If it 
is higher, the government will have to borrow a bit more; if it is less, less 
borrowing will be required.  Assuming that the government's  borrowing rate is 
not affected by these fluctuations, the discounted values will cancel in a 
calculation of expected discounted revenue, leaving the discounted value of 
the expected revenue x in the budget constraint.  Thus, if we wish to consider 
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fiscal balance, the procedure based on expected flows discounted with the 
government's  borrowing rate is correct. 
However, expected fiscal balance may not be the only valid measure, or 
even the most informative measure, about fiscal incidence.  After all, raising 
a future individual's  fiscal burden by $100 in some cases and lowering it by 
$100 with the same probability in others needn't  be a matter of indifference 
to the individual if he is risk averse.  If the increased burden is associated 
with other negative news (as will be true, for example, if government revenue 
needs to rise during recessions), then these deviations from expected revenues 
will not cancel from the taxpayer's perspective.  To reflect this, we might 
wish to discount future receipts with a higher discount rate that accounts for 
this risk.  The effect will be to raise the level of receipts necessary for 
fiscal balance to be achieved, reflecting the fact that the burden of 
uncertain taxes exceeds their expected value.  Likewise, the treatment of 
government spending and transfers should be adjusted for risk, although one 
should use the same discount rate only if the fluctuations in such spending 
have the same risk characteristics  as taxes do. 
In  our simulations below, we make different interest-rate  assumptions in 
calculating fiscal balance in order to accommodate the alternative views just 
discussed.  The first approach is to apply a low, risk-free  rate to the 
projected flows, in keeping with the view of fiscal balance as expected 
balance.  The second is to apply a market rate, adjusted for risk, in our 
discounting of all of the flows in the government's  budget constraint.  This 




Tables 1 and 2 contain the generational accounts for males and females 
for different combinations  of growth-rate and interest-rate assumptions. 
Tables la-c  and 2a-c  contain the same information for alternative assumptions 
about population structure, the treatment of capital income taxation, and the 
discount rate, which we will discuss after reviewing the results in the first 
two tables. 
All of these tables show positive values for the accounts of young and 
middle-aged  cohorts alive in 1989, indicating that these generations will, on 
balance, pay more in present value than they receive.  For generations of 
males aged 65 and older, the net present value of payments is negative.  This 
primarily reflects the fact that older generations, whose members are 
typically retired, can expect to pay relatively little in labor income taxes 
and payroll taxes over the rest of their lives, while receiving significant 
Social Security, Medicare, and retirement benefits.  For females, the 
generational accounts are negative for those aged 55 and over.  The younger 
age at which this occurs for women is attributable to the lower labor-force 
participation rates of women and the fact that many women receive Social 
Security benefits as dependents of older spouses. 
In tables 1 and 2, the values of the accounts more than double between 
age zero and age 25.  For example, in the case g-.0075  and r-.06  (which  we 
take as our "base case"), the age zero account for males is $73.7 thousand and 
the age 25 account is $193.0 thousand.  This simply reflects the fact that 25- 
year-olds  are closer to their peak taxpaying years than are newborns.  The 
accounts are most negative around age 75.  For the base case, the age 75 
account is -$41.5  thousand. 
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present value of amounts that males and females born in 1990  will pay, on 
average, assuming that subsequent generations pay this same amount except for 
an adjustment for growth.  For the base case, this amount is $89.5  thousand 
for males.  This means that males born in 1990 will be greeted with a bill 
from all levels of government of $89.5 thousand, which is 20.5  percent larger 
than the bill facing newborns in 1989, adjusted for growth (the amount that 
the 1989 newborns are expected to pay, on average [$73.7 thousand], times one 
plus the growth rate  [1.0075],  or $74.3 thousand).  Males born in 1991 will 
face a bill for $90.2 thousand, which equals $89.5 thousand multiplied by 
1.0075; males born in 1992 will pay $90.8 thousand ($89.5 thousand times 
1.0075 squared),  and so forth.  For females born in 1990, the bill will be 
$44.2 thousand, based on the assumption that future female and male "birth 
bills" have the same ratio as those of age zero males and females in 1989. 
Tables la-c  (males) and 2a-c  (females) present the same calculations 
under different assumptions.  Tables la and 2a show the results of assuming 
that no further demographic change will occur in the United States, i.e., that 
the population age distribution will be constant after 1990.  These tables are 
helpful in  understanding the fiscal impact of the continuing demographic 
transition to an  older population.  Assuming that the population structure 
remains constant, the tables show that younger generations, those who will 
bear the brunt of the fiscal burdens from the demographic shift, would be 
better off.  This is particularly true for males. 
Tables lb and 2b demonstrate the importance of our special treatment of 
capital income taxes.  Treating all capital income taxes as marginal taxes on 
new capital income lowers the fiscal burden on  older living generations, since 
these groups are no longer being assigned the reduction in capital values 
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generations would face a somewhat higher fiscal burden, since these groups 
hold little capital and will face many years of somewhat higher marginal tax 
rates.  On balance, the reduced capital income taxes facing older living 
generations and the slightly increased capital income taxes facing younger 
living generations imply a considerably larger burden on future generations. 
For the base case parameters, accounts of future generations are now 33.3 
percent (rather than 20.5 percent) larger than the growth-adjusted value for 
newborns in 1989.  Thus, failure to take account of the capitalization  of some 
capital income taxes causes one to understate the viability of the current tax 
structure by ignoring the taxes that will be collected on the income from 
previously acquired capital. 
As we indicated above, the choice of  which discount rate to use in these 
tables depends on  how one interprets the concept of fiscal balance in the 
context of uncertainty.  The preceding tables have presented generational 
accounts for a range around 6 percent, corresponding to our "high" interest- 
rate assumption.  Tables lc and 2c repeat the exercise of tables 1 and 2, but 
for a lower range of interest rates centered around 3 percent, closer to the 
real government borrowing rate.  The most significant effect of this change is 
to increase the measured burdens facing newborns, since these burdens are 
based largely on discounted payments and receipts that will occur many years 
hence.  However, the same conclusion  reached above, that the burdens must rise 
for future generations, still holds here. 
The robustness of this last result is amplified  by table 3, which 
presents for a wide range of growth- and interest-rate  combinations the 
percentage difference in payments required from future generations.  The table 
indicates that for a range of reasonable growth- and interest-rate 
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fiscal burdens than those faced by current age zero generations (adjusted for 
growth).  For the base case, the difference is 20.5  percent.  For the low- 
interest-rate  case with the same rate of productivity growth (r-.03, g-.0075), 
the percentage difference is somewhat larger, about 21.6 percent.  More 
optimistic growth-rate  assumptions do not materially affect the conclusion of 
a roughly 20 to 22 percent larger (growth-adjusted) burden on future 
generations as compared with that on current generations. 
B. 1 
Appendix tables 1 and 2 provide for current male and female generations a 
breakdown of the accounts by different types of receipts and expenditures. 
The growth and interest rates used in the tables are the base-case values. 
All figures are present values.  For example,  males who are 30 years old in 
1989 will, on average, pay $194.5 thousand in present value to the government 
over the course of their remaining lives.  This figure reflects the difference 
between the $222.8 thousand in the present value of payments to the government 
less the $28.3 thousand in the present value of receipts from the government. 
The largest source of present-value payments is the $74.4 thousand in FICA and 
other payroll taxes, followed by $69.6 thousand in labor income taxes, $38.4 
thousand in capital income taxes, and $34.2 thousand in excise taxes.  The 
largest sources of present-value  receipts are $14.3  thousand in Social 
Security OASDI benefits, followed by  $5.4 thousand in general welfare (which 
includes Medicaid),  $4.6  thousand in Medicare, and $2.3 thousand in 
unemployment insurance benefits. 
Appendix tables 3 and 4  further clarify the determinants of these present 
values.  They detail, for different 1989 male and female generations,  the 
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members of these generations are projected rn  pay, on average, in specific 
years in the future.  For a male who is 30 years old in 1989, total 1989 net 
payments are, on average, $14,104.  His average net payment 30 years later 
when he reaches age 60 is projected to equal $32,294.  The tables show clearly 
the age pattern of the government's various payments and receipts.  For 
example, OASDI benefits for a male who is 30 years old in 1989 are, on 
average, only $106, but grow to $10,221 at age 80. 
C.  The Effect of Policv Changes on Generational Accounts 
Tables 4 and 4a explore the impact on generational accounts of a variety 
of alternative fiscal policies, assuming 6 and 3 percent rates of interest, 
respectively.  Both tables assume the base-case  .0075 growth rate.  The tables 
compare the generational accounts of newborn and future generations before and 
after the change in policy.  Appendix tables 5 and 6 indicate the impact of 
the various policies on the generational accounts of older generations, 
assuming base-case parameter values.  Appendix tables 5a and 6a repeat the 
analysis assuming a 3 percent interest rate. 
Capital Gains Tax Cut 
The first policy considered is the administration's 1989 capital gains 
tax cut proposal.  In analyzing this proposal, we used the Joint Committee on 
Taxation's  (JCT) revenue estimates; specifically, we raised or lowered 
projected cohort-specific  average capital income tax payments each year in the 
future by a factor that would leave total projected capital income tax 
payments in that year larger or smaller by the amount of revenue gain or loss 
projected by the JCT.  The results of this experiment indicate that the 
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approximately $1,271 ($629) on each future generation of males (females). 
Appendix tables 5 and 6 and 5a and 6a indicate that most of the benefits from 
the capital gains proposal would accrue to currently middle-aged  generations. 
For example, assuming base-case  parameters, 45-year-old males are, on average, 
projected to receive roughly $600 in present value as a result of the capital 
gains tax cut proposal. 
No Reduction in Social Security 
The next policy experiment involves a cancellation  of the 1983 Social 
Security amendments.  In this simulation,  we do not reduce future Social 
Security benefits of generations attaining age 65 in the year 2000 and beyond 
according to the procedure described in this section.  The impact of reversing 
the Social Security amendments is particularly strong for middle-aged  men and 
women.  According to appendix tables 5 and 6, for base-case  parameters. 40- 
year-old  men would benefit by about $2,600,  and 40-year-old  women by 
approximately $2,400,  in present value from such a reversal in policy. 
Faster Medicare Growth 
The third policy we consider is faster growth in Medicare expenditures. 
Rather than projecting current spending levels forward at the growth rate of 
other spending, we assume that medical costs will continue to rise more 
quickly than other government expenses.  In particular, we assume that the 
rate of growth of Medicare expenditures is 2 percentage points higher than the 
economy's  growth rate for the 20-year  period between 1990 and 2010.  The 
experiment produces a sharp jump in the extra burden to be placed on future 
generations: With base-case  parameters, newborns in 1990 will face an extra 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmburden of $15.8 thousand for males and $7.2  thousand for females; these 
figures translate into a 42.7 percent larger burden on future generations than 
on current age zero generations, adjusted for growth.  The simulated Medicare 
policy provides a sizable benefit to existing older generations.  For example, 
65-year-old  males are estimated to receive an additional $5.1  thousand in 
present value from this policy option. 
Given the extraordinary growth in health care spending in recent years, 
one might well believe that this simulation represents a more realistic view 
of current policy than our "current  policyn projection, which assumes only 
trend growth in Medicare.  Clearly, there are alternative views of what 
constitutes the expected near- and longer-term  treatment of current 
generations.  Ideally, one would have information on the public's  expectation 
of the future treatment of current generations to guide in the formation of 
the "current policyn projection.  Certainly, in assessing current policy, 
there is no reason to restrict oneself to what is actually legislated.  We 
offer our "current policy" projection as an initial benchmark from which to 
consider possibly more realistic assessments of the future treatment of 
current generations. 
Savings and Loan Bailout 
The recent savings and loan debacle and bailout illustrates the 
difficulties of measuring "the" deficit.  The episode has prompted debates 
about whether bailout financing should be "off-budgetn and whether the funds 
raised should "count" toward the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  targets.  Such 
discussions are really irrelevant if the goal is to determine who will bear 
the costs of this mammoth new government spending program.  To model this, we 
assume that the government issues $500 billion of new bonds in 1990 to make 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmgood the claims against the insolvent Sas,  and raises taxes only on  new 
generations.  We treat the bailout essentially as the undoing of a casualty 
loss, in that the current generations are assumed to be kept whole by the 
bailout; i.e.,  the $500  billion simply offsets $500  billion in losses caused 
by  the insolvencies.  Tables 4  and 4a indicate that this exercise will cost 
each 1990 newborn male $9.4 thousand assuming a 6 percent interest rate, and 
$4.2 thousand assuming a 3 percent interest rate. 
Slower Growth in Government Consumption 
One of the goals of those who seek to improve the fiscal situation is to 
"get spending under control."  We model this by simulating the effects of zero 
growth in government consumption for a period of 10 years with the growth in 
government consumption after the 10-year period occurring at the assumed 
economywide growth rate.  For base-case  parameters, the impact of this reduced 
spending is to lower the burden of future generations substantially, by about 
$24.7 thousand per male and $12.2 thousand per female.  The large impact of 
this policy can be understood by considering the size of its effect with 
reference to the terms entering the government's  intertemporal budget 
constraint given in equation (1).  Under our base-case  assumptions, the 
present value of government consumption is $25.386 trillion, the present value 
of payments by existing generations is $21.166 trillion, government net wealth 
is $  -0.516  trillion, and the present value of payments by future generations 
is $4.737 trillion.  The simulated 10-year policy of zero growth in government 
consumption followed by trend growth means the level of government consumption 
in year 10 and beyond is lower than under the "current policy" simulation. 
The effect of this policy is to lower the present value of government 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmconsumption by $1.307 trillion, which is sizable compared to what would 
otherwise be the burden on future generations, namely $4.736  trillion. 
The Government's  New Budget Deal 
We examine three alternative views of the recent budget deal.  The first 
alternative, A, assumes that the changes made to taxes and spending will be 
permanent; the second, B, assumes that only the reductions in government 
consumption spending will be permanent; and the third, C, assumes that the 
provisions will last for only five years, after which taxes and government 
consumption spending will revert to the values they would have had without the 
budget deal.5  The results indicate that the importance of the budget deal 
depends very much on its duration.  If the deal is temporary, case C, future 
male generations will benefit by $6.4 thousand, but if it is permanent, case 
A, they will benefit by $39.7 thousand.  The loss to current generations is 
also quite sensitive to the duration of the new policy.  If  kept in place, it 
will, for example, mean a $4.3 thousand present value loss to current 35-year- 
old males.  If it is temporary, the loss to current 35-year-old  males is only 
about $900.  Appendix tables 5, 5a, 6, and 6a indicate that the current 
elderly will pay a considerable share of the total costs to current 
generations of the new legislation, although this share differs depending on 
the longevity of the policy. 
In  understanding the magnitude of the new budget deal, it may help to 
consider its effects on the components of the government's  intertemporal 
budget constraint.  In the simulation(s)  in  which the budget deal is 
permanent, the present value of government consumption falls by $1.262 
trillion; in the temporary case, it falls by $175 billion.  In the permanent 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsimulation, the present value burden on existing generations rises by $864 
billion; in the temporary simulation, it rises by $161 billion. 
VII. Summary 
The ongoing debate about how to define the federal budget deficit is 
symptomatic of the need for a proper conceptual framework for describing 
generational policy.  Unfortunately, the budget deficit, no matter how it is 
defined, cannot provide a proper assessment of generational policy.  As an 
alternative to economically arbitrary budget deficits, this paper has provided 
a set of generational accounts indicating the net present value of payments of 
existing generations to the government.  We have used these accounts and 
additional data concerning the government's  intertemporal budget constraint to 
assess the magnitude of the fiscal burden being placed on future generations 
by current generations and to consider the burden on future generations of a 
set of hypothetical fiscal policies.  The findings suggest that unless policy 
toward existing generations, including those who have just been born, is 
substantially altered (for example, through a real adherence to the 1990 
budget deal),  future generations will face a roughly 20-percent  larger net tax 
burden over the course of their lifetimes than current newborns. 
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1. 1,  Appendix to Chapter 4, reports 
both the conventional deficit and the deficit that arises from defining Social 
Security contributions as "loans" to the government. 
2. Our question is related to that posed in recent empirical studies (e.g., 
Hamilton and Flavin [I9861 and Wilcox [1989]); it asks whether government debt 
will explode given current policy.  However, we address the question of 
intertemporal government budget balance in a different and, in our view, more 
satisfactory manner. 
3. The fact that components of government consumption expenditures are 
targeted toward specific age groups suggests including the present value of 
such expenditures in forming the N  's  and the ESsk's in equation (3).  In  t,k  future work we intend to present the generational accounts both including and 
excluding the present value of age-specific  government consumption spending in 
forming the Nt ,  k's  and the Es k'"' 
However, for the economic, as opposed to 
accounting, questions of how t  e N  's  of future generations compare with  t k  those of the current newborn generation and how changes in policy will change 
the values of the Nt,k's  for existing generations, the inclusion or exclusion 
of age-specific government consumption spending on existing generations is 
irrelevant.  The analysis of the differential incidence of redistributing 
across generations the burden of paying for the government's  consumption can 
be conducted holding the generational pattern of government consumption 
expenditures constant. 
4. For future work in which we will measure imputed rent on government 
durables, we will also take account of government tangible assets using 
measurements reported by Eisner and Pieper (1984) and Boskin et al. (1987). 
5. In  these simulations, we assume that total taxes are increased in 1991 by 
$21.7 billion, in 1992 by $32.3 billion, in 1993 by $30.4 billion, in 1994  by 
$35.1 billion, and in 1995 by $35.1 billion.  The respective annual reductions 
in total transfer payments are $3.4 billion, $5.9 billion, $8.4 billion, $11.4 
billion, and $13.4 billion.  Finally, the respective annual reductions in 
total government consumption are $15.8 billion, $32.2 billion, $46.1 billion, 
$62.7 billion, and $73.5 billion.  These aggregate figures as well as the 
composition of taxes and transfers across the different types of taxes and 
transfers were obtained from Congressional documents describing the budget 
deal. 
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Interest 
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The Allocation of Capital Income Taxes 
As mentioned in the text, there are two related problems with using 
capital income taxes as measured to determine the burden of capital income 
taxation.  First, existing assets may have excess future taxes capitalized 
into their values; such taxes should not be assigned to new investors even if 
these taxes occur in the future.  On the other hand, the timing of tax 
payments from new investment may have a different pattern than would an income 
tax, meaning that the ratio of current annual tax payments to income may not 
provide an accurate measure of the effective marginal tax rate facing new 
investment. 
In this .appendix,  we derive the formula used to calculate the capitalized 
value of taxes on existing capital and the correction  needed to transform 
total capital income tax payments into an estimate of capital income tax 
payments on new investment.  Our formula is based on the user cost of capital 
approach (see, for example, Auerbach  [1983]), which assumes that the marginal 
product of capital equals the user cost of capital, C, where 
where r is the investor's  required after-tax return, 6 is the investment's 
economic rate of depreciation, r  is the investor's marginal tax rate, and z is 
the present value of depreciation allowances.  We wish to calculate two 
measures.  The first, which we denote by Q, is the tax-based discount on old 
capital, which equals the difference between tax savings from depreciation 
allowances per unit of new capital and those available per unit of existing 
capital  : 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmwhere zO is the present value of depreciation allowances per unit of old 
capital. 
Measured capital income tax payments are not based on the effective rate 
of tax on new capital m, where 
Instead they are based on an average tax rate, a, where 
and b is the average current depreciation  deduction per unit of total capital. 
Comparing (A3) and (A4) indicates that we must correct measured taxes per unit 
of capital by subtracting from a(C-6)  the term A, where 
(A5  )  A =  (a-m) (C-6 ) . 
To calculate the terms zO in (A2) and b in (A4), we must consider past 
patterns of investment.  Assume investment grows at rate n.  Then at date 0 
(the present) the nominal amount of capital purchased at date -s  was Ioe- 
("*Is,  where x  is the inflation rate.  If this investment has been written 
off at the constant geometric rate $,  the asset at date 0  has a basis of Ioe' 
("+")s~+s  and receives depreciation allowances of $ times this basis.  Thus, 
total allowances on the existing capital stock K are 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmSince the capital stock equals the sum of depreciated net investment, we have 
Equations (A6) and (A7) imply 
The present value of all depreciation allowances on old capital equals 
the basis of each vintage multiplied by the present value of remaining 
depreciation deductions on that vintage, or 
A 
where z is the present value of depreciation allowances per unit of 
depreciated basis. 
Substituting (A3),  (A4), and (A8) into (A5) yields 
Substituting (A9) into (A2) implies 
Expressions (A10) and (All) may be simplified if we make the realistic (under 
A 
current tax law) assumption that z - z;  thus 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmand 
We assume that 6n.08 and n=.03.  These values are roughly consistent with 
the average depreciation rates and past growth rates for equipment and 
structures (see Auerbach and Hines [1987]).  We further assume for purposes of 
these calculations that r-.04.  For these values and for an inflation rate of 
4  percent, depreciation allowances (the right-hand  side of [A14]) provide 
roughly the same present value as true economic depreciation (the left-hand 
side of [A141  ) . 
When r-v.04 and 69.08, we have from (A14) that e.16.  For our calculation of 
the actual value of z  based on this value of $,  we assume p.05 to maintain 
consistency with our other calculations.  (Using p.04 rather than .05  has no 
important impact on the results.)  In addition, we assume that the tax rate r 
equals .32.  This value is less than the statutory rate of .34,  with the 
difference reflecting the small difference between corporate and personal 
statutory rates.  These assumptions lead to the values A-.00111  and Q-.Ill. 
This value of Q is consistent  with earlier direct calculations  based on tax 
provisions similar to those enacted in 1986 (Auerbach and Hines [1987]). 
These fractions are multiplied by $5,488.8 billion, the value of depreciable 
assets held by  taxable investors in 1989, to arrive at the numbers cited in 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe text, namely,  a $6.09 billion subtraction from  current  total capital 
income  taxes and  a $609 billion capitalized burden on  old capital. 
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